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Abstract 19 
The current study investigated children’s solution choice and imitation of causally-irrelevant 20 
actions by using a controlled design to mirror naturalistic learning contexts in which children 21 
receive social information for tasks about which they have some degree of prior knowledge. 22 
Five-year-old children (N = 167) were presented with a reward retrieval task and either given 23 
a social demonstration of a solution or no information, thus potentially acquiring a solution 24 
through personal exploration. Fifty-three children who acquired a solution either socially or 25 
asocially were then presented with an alternative solution that included irrelevant actions. 26 
Rather than remaining polarised to their initial solution like non-human animals, these 27 
children attempted the newly presented solution, incorporating both solutions into their 28 
repertoire. Such an adaptive and flexible learning strategy could increase task knowledge, 29 
provide generalizable knowledge in our tool-abundant culture and facilitate cumulative 30 
culture. Furthermore, children who acquired a solution through personally acquired 31 
information omitted subsequently demonstrated irrelevant actions to a greater extent than did 32 
children with prior social information. However, as some children with successful personally 33 
acquired information did copy the demonstrated irrelevant actions, we suggest that copying 34 
irrelevant actions may be influenced by social and causal cognition, resulting in an effective 35 
strategy which may facilitate acquisition of cultural norms when used discerningly.  36 
 37 
Key words: social learning, source of information, imitation, irrelevant actions, overimitation  38 
 3 
 
Children are prolific social learners and the extent of their faithful imitation of a model’s 39 
behaviour is matched by no other species including other great apes (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, 40 
Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Tennie, Greve, Gretcher, & Call, 2010; Whiten, McGuigan, 41 
Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). A wealth of previous research demonstrates that 42 
providing children with social information about a novel artefact can lead to the canalisation 43 
of behaviour, whereby children faithfully reproduce an observed behaviour without 44 
attempting possible alternatives (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a; Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 45 
2010; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006), sometimes leading to the copying of clearly 46 
causally irrelevant actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). 47 
Children’s copying of irrelevant actions appears in different cultures (e.g. Kalahari Bushmen, 48 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010 and western society, Horner & Whiten, 2005), increases with age 49 
(McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen, 2006) into adulthood (Flynn & Smith, 50 
2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011), and persists despite many forms of 51 
intervention (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011).  52 
As children often receive social information regarding artefacts about which they have some 53 
degree of prior knowledge, the overarching aim of the current study was to understand how 54 
children’s imitation of socially demonstrated solutions and causally irrelevant actions are 55 
influenced by experiencing multiple solutions to a problem.  56 
When new social information contrasts with prior information children may draw 57 
upon ‘social learning strategies’, heuristics guiding their use of social information (Laland, 58 
2004). Boyd and Richerson (1985) suggest that learning one solution can inhibit further 59 
exploration of a problem, with such conservatism common in non-human animals. 60 
Chimpanzees that discover one solution for food retrieval are unlikely to try a more efficient 61 
solution and when one solution is precluded, those expert in the blocked solution do not adopt 62 
an alternative solution (Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van Schaik, 2009). Similarly, Hopper, 63 
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Schapiro, Lambeth and Brosnan (2011) found conservatism to initial social information even 64 
when an alternative behaviour, which was similar in difficulty, produced a higher value 65 
reward. Conservatism to personally acquired information continues in the face of equally 66 
beneficial alternate social information in a number of species (starlings, Templeton & 67 
Giraldeau, 1996; guppies, Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2004; sticklebacks, van Bergen, 68 
Coolen, & Laland, 2004; see Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005 for a review). This 69 
reluctance to weight social information over personally acquired information can be 70 
overcome with sufficiently persuasive social information (nutmeg manikins, Rieucau & 71 
Giraldeau, 2009), costs to using personal information (fish, Kendal et al., 2004; orangutans, 72 
Lehner, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2011), or when individuals are allowed continued attempts to 73 
retrieve a reward (capuchin monkeys, Dindo, Thierry, de Waal, & Whiten, 2010).  74 
We address children’s use of these strategies by investigating children’s behaviour 75 
after prior task experience and subsequent demonstrations of alternate task solutions which 76 
included causally irrelevant actions. Specifically, relating to differing solutions of an 77 
artificial-fruit task, we investigate: (1) how children weigh an initial socially demonstrated 78 
task solution with a subsequent socially demonstrated task solution, (2) whether personally 79 
acquired information affects children’s copying of subsequent socially demonstrated 80 
solutions, (3) solution choice over time and (4) the influence of prior experience on the often 81 
prevalent reproduction of irrelevant actions. 82 
 83 
1.1 Demonstrations of alternative solutions 84 
Our first research question investigated how children weigh an initial socially 85 
demonstrated task solution with a subsequent socially demonstrated task solution. 86 
Traditionally, social learning studies have presented social information in the form of one or 87 
multiple demonstrations of the same solution, resulting in children faithfully copying the 88 
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demonstrated solution in subsequent trials (Flynn & Whiten, 2008a, 2008b; Hopper et al., 89 
2010; Horner et al., 2006). For example, Flynn and Whiten (2008a) found that only one child 90 
out of 80 attempted a solution that was different to the one witnessed. Similarly, in infancy 91 
use of a familiar tool is inflexible relative to a novel tool (Barrett, Davis, & Needham, 2007). 92 
Further, in studies of normativity children protest when an individual subsequently performs 93 
a behaviour that the child associates with a different, previously socially learnt behaviour 94 
(Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), suggesting that once a model demonstrates a 95 
solution children are quick to establish how something ‘ought’ to be done and do not accept 96 
the more recently demonstrated behaviour.  97 
In contrast, Siegler and Opfer (2003) found that when working through mathematical 98 
problems children possess multiple numerical representations, such that a single child could 99 
utilise different methods to obtain the correct answer to similar problems. They suggested 100 
that children are motivated to acquire multiple strategies to solve a problem and that when 101 
similar problems are presented close in time children may use different solution strategies in 102 
their repertoire. In the current study, where some children were provided with social 103 
demonstrations of alternative solutions, we predicted that children would imitate the model’s 104 
first demonstration. We made no clear predictions about what children would do upon 105 
witnessing a second, alternative solution. Such an investigation, however, is important as it 106 
reflects real-life learning and reveals the relative prevalence of solution canalisation and 107 
multiple strategy acquisition.  108 
 109 
1.2 Personally acquired information 110 
The relation between children’s acquisition of knowledge through their own 111 
experience (personal learning) and through their interactions with others (social learning) has 112 
been of interest since the beginning of the empirical study of developmental psychology (e.g. 113 
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Piaget, reviewed by DeVries (1997)). Adults can demonstrate an inherent resistance to 114 
changing their opinion (Ehlrich & Levin, 2005) and although the number of, consensus 115 
among, and performance of demonstrators can result in adults disregarding their personal 116 
choice, participant confidence, success rate and non-public answers increase the probability 117 
of maintaining one’s own choice (Asch, 1951, 1956; Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & 118 
Laland, 2012). Children with divergent personal information, regarding solutions to a reward 119 
extraction task, tend to converge upon a single solution in a social setting (Flynn & Whiten, 120 
2010) suggesting children have some degree of social conventionality. If, however, social 121 
information is inaccurate (Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004), if the model is demonstrating 122 
an inefficient (Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011) or non-affordant method (DiYanni & Kelemen, 123 
2008), or if the model has an ‘unreliable’ reputation (Ma & Ganea, 2010), children are more 124 
likely to rely upon their personally acquired information. Equally, when children are 125 
presented with a difficult experience of retrieving a reward, they copy an alternative 126 
technique (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011). 127 
Likewise, when a child’s personally-acquired easy solution to a task becomes ineffective s/he 128 
defers to a model’s task actions (Williamson et al., 2008). In the current study the difficulty 129 
or effectiveness of the solution was not manipulated. Therefore, the current study makes a 130 
significant contribution to previous research by addressing children’s relative weighting of 131 
prior, personally-acquired information against subsequent socially-acquired information 132 
when both provide solutions of comparable efficiency and validity. Due to the novelty of our 133 
research question we made no specific predictions regarding children’s solution choice. 134 
 135 
1.3 Solution choice over time 136 
Traditionally, observational learning studies provide children with a single phase 137 
consisting of a demonstration of either a single (Lyons et al., 2007) or two or three (Flynn & 138 
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Whiten, 2008b; Wood et al., 2012) demonstrations of the same solution, followed by a 139 
response phase. In the current study there were two phases of demonstrations (differing 140 
varieties) and responses consisting of two to seven trials. This allowed investigation of 141 
whether the number of solutions children experience and the source (personal/social) of those 142 
solutions affected their behaviour as their task experience increased. Whilst previous studies 143 
show canalisation to a demonstrated solution (as outlined above), there are rare instances of 144 
innovation and behavioural spread of such innovations (Whiten & Flynn, 2010) suggesting 145 
that as a child’s experience with a task grows and as other solutions are witnessed s/he may 146 
be motivated to explore alternative solutions.  147 
 148 
1.4 Irrelevant action imitation 149 
There are conflicting theories as to why children imitate irrelevant actions. Lyons et 150 
al. (2011) suggest that when naïve children receive social information their causal beliefs 151 
become distorted by the demonstration of irrelevant actions to the extent that they believe that 152 
such actions are causally necessary. Alternatively, children may not encode these actions as 153 
functionally necessary to acquiring the reward. Instead, they are unsure of the purpose of the 154 
actions and copy them as a default strategy which is refined later (Whiten, Horner, & 155 
Marshall-Pescini, 2005), or they interpret the model’s actions as meaningful (Nielsen & 156 
Tomaselli, 2010), or normative (Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Kenward, 2012). 157 
Conversely, children may copy irrelevant actions to serve a social function of sharing an 158 
experience with a model (Užgiris, 1981) whereby children's social goals, identification with 159 
the model and with the social group in general, influences the copying of irrelevant actions 160 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012).  161 
The current study aimed to discern between these explanations by asking a number of 162 
critical questions. First, does the social demonstration of two alternative methods lead to the 163 
 8 
 
extraction of only the critical sequences of actions required to reach a desired goal 164 
(Buchsbaum, Gopnik, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2011; Byrne, 1999)? Second, would children 165 
incorporate irrelevant actions presented in a demonstration that used the same solution as the 166 
children had themselves previously discovered? With both these questions, if the children 167 
omit the irrelevant actions it would suggest that the imitation of irrelevant actions may be due 168 
to adapted casual reasoning or, more simply, employ a strategy of ‘copy now, refine later’ 169 
(Whiten et al., 2005). Alternatively, if children copy these irrelevant actions faithfully it 170 
would suggest a more normative or social explanation. Third, does personally acquired 171 
experience decrease the copying of irrelevant actions of a previously unseen solution? 172 
Williamson et al. (2008) and Williamson and Meltzoff (2011) found that children with 173 
personally acquired success do not adopt an alternative technique involving the use of an 174 
opaque, causally irrelevant action. By presenting both an alternative solution and irrelevant 175 
actions within that solution we investigated whether children would be faithful to their 176 
previous solution, or whether they would adopt the new solution, either only including the 177 
relevant actions, or in its entirety. If children imitate the alternative strategy but do not imitate 178 
the irrelevant actions it would suggest that there is an absence of social or normative 179 
motivation towards copying the puppet’s irrelevant actions. Instead, their omission would 180 
suggest that children’s personally acquired information gives them a casual understanding of 181 
the task (Lyons et al., 2011), or already refines their understanding of the task (Whiten et al., 182 
2005) suggesting a more causal explanation for irrelevant action reproduction.  183 
 184 
1.5 Summary 185 
This study investigated how 5-year-old children behave after experiencing multiple 186 
solutions to a problem. Children of this age were chosen to allow for a comparison with 187 
related empirical work investigating imitation of tool use (e.g. Buchsbaum et al., 2011; 188 
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McGuigan et al., 2010; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Wood et al., 2012). Our study adopted a 189 
two-action artificial fruit paradigm (Dawson & Foss, 1965; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, 190 
Teixidor, & Bard, 1996), the Sweep-Drawer Box (SDB, see Figure 1), a puzzle-box that 191 
contained a reward held in place by a series of defences. Critically, there were two separate 192 
solutions to the SDB, a drawer and a sweep mechanism that could be used to release the 193 
reward. Using a task with two possible solutions allowed a number of distinctions to be 194 
identified: (a) the propensity to discover each of these solutions during personal exploration, 195 
(b) the level of replication of a demonstrated solution compared to the level of production of 196 
an alternative solution, and (c) fidelity or exploration of solution use once an alternative 197 
solution was demonstrated. Irrelevant actions were incorporated into the demonstrations 198 
allowing investigation of whether personally acquired information, or multiple solution 199 
demonstrations, would reduce the copying of irrelevant actions. We made no specific 200 
predictions regarding a child’s solution choice or irrelevant action reproduction following 201 
receipt of additional social information but such an investigation allowed us to examine such 202 
real-life contexts in a controlled manner.  203 
  (a)      (b)      (c)       (d) 204 
Figure 1. The Sweep-Drawer Box (panel a). Puppet using the sweep (panel b). Top view of 205 
SDB showing movement of sweep and drawer (panel c). Puppet using the drawer (panel d). 206 
 207 
2. Method 208 
2.1 Design 209 
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 The experiment had two phases both consisting of task information and task 210 
interaction. Phase 1 manipulated the source of the child’s original task information such that 211 
children either had personal or social experience. Phase 2 manipulated the subsequent task 212 
information such that successful children either had agreeing or opposing solutions or no 213 
further information and unsuccessful children either had their first demonstration or no 214 
further information. This design facilitated the investigation of children’s behaviour after 215 
experiencing multiple solutions to a problem through the following assessments: (1) 216 
children’s behaviour following alternative (Phase 1 and Phase 2) socially-demonstrated task 217 
solutions; (2) children’s solution choice following personally acquired information (Phase 1) 218 
and subsequent social information (Phase 2); (3) tracking solution choice over time (in 219 
multiple Phase 2 response trials); and (4) investigating the often prevalent reproduction of 220 
irrelevant actions following both phases. 221 
 222 
2.2 Participants 223 
One hundred and seventy children were recruited from eleven primary schools in 224 
County Durham, UK. Three participants were excluded from the study due to experimenter 225 
error leaving 167 (79 males, M = 65.7 months, SD = 3.52 months). There were no significant 226 
differences in sex [χ2 (7, N = 167) = 3.22, p = .86] or age (F7, 159 = 0.76, p = .62) distribution 227 
across the eight conditions.  228 
  229 
2.3 Apparatus 230 
A two-action task, the ‘Sweep-Drawer Box’ (SDB, see Figure 1), was used. The SDB 231 
is a transparent box with an opening at the top where a capsule containing a reward (a sticker) 232 
can be inserted. After insertion the capsule falls onto an opaque platform where one of two 233 
spatially separated and functionally unique mechanisms can be manipulated in order to push 234 
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the capsule to a lower level. These two manipulandi are, (1) a silver sweeper with a red 235 
handle (see Figure 1b) that when pushed moves the capsule to a hole through which the 236 
capsule falls to the lower level, and (2) a blue drawer with a red handle (see Figure 1d) that 237 
can be pulled outwards producing a gap through which the capsule falls to the lower level. 238 
Once in the lower level the capsule rests behind a black opaque door which can be opened to 239 
obtain the sticker. The capsule containing the sticker was inserted into the SDB by the 240 
experimenter with her left hand and on her right hand was a puppet, ‘Pip’. A puppet was used 241 
to avoid a model-based bias of copying the irrelevant actions of an adult model (see Wood et 242 
al., 2012). Whilst there is a potential issue with the experimenter also being the controller of 243 
the puppet we found that children were markedly different in their reactions to Pip than they 244 
had been to the same experimenter in previous studies (Wood et al., 2012), instead their 245 
behaviour was similar to studies where a second experimenter had operated puppets (e.g. 246 
Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009; Kenward, 2012). For example, participants 247 
exclaimed (when Pip performed irrelevant actions), ‘Silly Pip, why is Pip doing silly things?’ 248 
and (when demonstrating the alternate method), ‘Pip, you are cheating’. Although anecdotal, 249 
this suggests that the experimenter operating the puppet did not influence children’s copying 250 
any more than another adult operating the puppet.  251 
 252 
2.4 Procedure 253 
Children were tested individually at a table in a quiet area in their school. First the 254 
experimenter introduced the child to the puppet ‘Pip’ and completed a few easy tasks, such as 255 
finding stickers, to relax the child and introduce the concept of turn-taking with the puppet. 256 
The child was then asked to sit in front of the SDB and the experimenter said, “Today I have 257 
brought in this toy. I would like you and Pip to take turns to see if you can get the sticker out. 258 
Take a really good look at it. Can you see it Pip? (Pip nods). Can you see it (child’s name)?” 259 
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The experiment then consisted of two phases which involved information acquisition and the 260 
child’s subsequent task interaction. Which condition a participant was placed into was 261 
determined by systematic allocation in Phase 1 (every third child was given social 262 
information, and the other two-thirds were given no initial social information), their 263 
subsequent behaviour in Phase 1 and systematic allocation in Phase 2 (with distribution partly 264 
predetermined to ensure correct participant numbers per condition). Due to high levels of 265 
personal success at solving the task there were fewer children in no-information (Phase 1) 266 
conditions than personal (Phase 1) conditions. This design resulted in eight conditions (see 267 
Table 1).  268 
In Phase 1 children were given either no information and were told, “You play with it 269 
first,” and progressed straight to the task interaction part of Phase 1, or were told, “It’s Pip’s 270 
turn first” and given a demonstration prior to interacting with the task themselves; the 271 
children watched as the experimenter put the capsule in the SDB and then used her other 272 
hand, with the puppet on, to extract the reward twice, both times using the same solution (see 273 
Figure 1). The puppet’s sequence of actions was as follows: the capsule was moved from the 274 
opaque level to the lower level using either the sweep or drawer solution. Immediately after 275 
the capsule fell a further five irrelevant actions were performed with whichever manipulandi 276 
was being used, either the drawer or sweeper, so that it was moved a further five times 277 
(forwards and backwards for the sweeper and in and out for the drawer). Then the door was 278 
opened and the capsule obtained.  279 
After extraction, a sticker was put on Pip’s pile and the experimenter said, “That’s a 280 
sticker for Pip.” Demonstration of the two solutions (sweep or drawer) was counterbalanced 281 
across all conditions. Children then had two response trials, T1 and T2, and could interact 282 
with the task to successfully extract the reward using either the sweep or drawer solution 283 
(‘success’) or fail to extract the reward (‘fail’) after three minutes. Three minutes allowed 284 
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sufficient time for success with the SDB but did not make unsuccessful participants 285 
uncomfortable. If required, the child was given prompts such as, “You can play with it as 286 
much as you like. You won’t break it.” They were never explicitly told to touch any part of 287 
the SDB. If successful in T1 a sticker was added to a child’s pile and the child was allowed a 288 
second trial (T2). The children’s behaviour partly determined which Phase 2 information they 289 
received.  290 
In Phase 2 all children were told, “Now it’s Pip’s turn” and watched as the puppet did 291 
one of four things: (a) No information (conditions 3, 6 and 7a), in which the puppet looked at 292 
the SDB for 20 s but made no contact with it. Halfway through Pip was encouraged by the 293 
experimenter, “You can do whatever you like Pip, you won’t break it” and after 20 s the 294 
experimenter said, “I don’t think Pip wants a turn. It’s your turn now,” (b) Agreeing 295 
demonstration (conditions 2 and 5), in which the puppet extracted the reward twice, both 296 
times using the same solution as the child had used in Phase 1, (c) Alternate demonstration 297 
(conditions 1 and 4), in which the puppet extracted the reward twice, both times using the 298 
solution that the child had not previously used in Phase 1, and (d) First demonstration 299 
(condition 7b), 21 children who received no information and were unsuccessful in Phase 1, 300 
watched the puppet extract the reward twice using the same solution, with solution choice 301 
counterbalanced.  302 
At the beginning of the task interaction trials in Phase 2 all children were told, “It’s 303 
your turn again. See if you can get the sticker out.” The child was allowed to interact with the 304 
SDB until s/he retrieved the reward successfully or three minutes had elapsed. If children 305 
were successful a sticker was added to their pile and they were told, “It’s your turn again,” 306 
until they had finished the maximum number of trials. The first 82 children tested were given 307 
two trials (T3, T4); at this point it became apparent that solution alternation was occurring 308 
and so the remaining 85 children were given five response trials (T3, T4, T5, T6, & T7) to 309 
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investigate this further. At the end of testing all children were told they had done very well 310 
and were rewarded with stickers irrespective of their level of success.  311 
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Table 1: Overview of the six initial-success and two initial-failure conditions 312 
Note. In Phase 1 children were given either (a) no information, “You play with it first” or social information (B)“It’s Pip’s turn first” and given 313 
a demonstration. Children then had two response trials, T1 and T2, and could interact with the task to successfully extract the reward 314 
(‘success’) or fail to extract the reward (‘failure’). In Phase 2 all children watched either (a) no information, (b) an agreeing demonstration, (c) 315 
an alternate demonstration or (d) a first demonstration (for those who had failed). Children then had two or five response trials.316 
 Initial-success groups  Initial-fail groups 
 
 
1 
Personal-then-
social-alternate 
2 
Personal-then-
social-agreeing 
3 
Personal-then- 
none 
 4 
Social-then- 
social-alternate 
5 
Social-then- 
social-agreeing 
6 
Social-then-      
none 
 7a 
No 
information 
7b 
None-then- 
social 
Phase 1  
Information 
 
No information 
 
No information 
 
No information 
 
 
Demonstration 
 
Demonstration 
 
Demonstration 
 
 
No information 
 
No information 
Response Trials  Success Success Success  Success Success Success  Failure Failure 
Phase 2  
Information 
 
Alternate 
 
Agreeing 
 
No information 
 
 
Alternate 
 
Agreeing 
 
No information 
 
 
No information 
 
Demonstration 
Response Trials  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 T3 to T7  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 T3 to T7  T3 to T7 T3 to T7 
Sample size 
(males) 
32 (17) 21 (10) 21 (11)  21 (10) 21 (11) 21( 10)  9 (3) 21 (7) 
Age months M (SD) 66 (4) 66 (3) 66 (3)  66 (4) 66 (3) 65 (4)  64 (3) 65 (4) 
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2.5 Coding and inter-rater reliability 317 
Each participant’s performance was scored on three separate variables for each 318 
response trial, (a) success (sticker capsule removal), (b) solution used and (c) number of 319 
irrelevant actions copied (out of five). The experimenter, LW, coded 100% of the sample 320 
from video tape. An independent observer coded 26% of the sample. All Cronbach’s Alpha 321 
scores were 0.90 or above, showing an excellent level of inter-rater reliability. All tests are 322 
two-tailed unless otherwise stated. 323 
 324 
3. Results and discussion 325 
 Following a brief description of behaviour of children who were initially 326 
unsuccessful, the results and discussion are presented in four sections: (1) the effect of 327 
demonstrations of alternative solutions upon children’s subsequent solution choice, (2) the 328 
effect of personally acquired experience upon the imitation of subsequent socially 329 
demonstrated alternatives, (3) solution choice over time and (4) irrelevant action imitation.  330 
Of the 104 children who witnessed no demonstration, 30 children (29%) were 331 
unsuccessful. In Phase 2, these children were given either no further information (condition 332 
7a, n = 9) or a demonstration (condition 7b, n = 21). In the no further information condition, 333 
two of the nine children went onto successfully retrieve the reward. In the none-then-social 334 
condition, 20 of the 21 children successfully retrieved the reward after the demonstration, 335 
with all copying the solution witnessed, a statistically significant level of fidelity (p < .001, 336 
Binomial test). Fourteen of these 20 children copied an irrelevant action in T3, their first 337 
response trial in Phase 2. As the remaining two-thirds of children were able to retrieve the 338 
reward without social information, the SDB was challenging but within the capacity of most 339 
children.  340 
 341 
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3.1 Demonstrations of alternative solutions 342 
 The first research question focused on children’s behaviour following demonstrations 343 
of alternative methods. In Phase 1 sixty-three children received a social demonstration and all 344 
were successful in Phase 1 response trials. Children who witnessed a demonstration were 345 
significantly more successful at T1 than children who had not witnessed a demonstration (p < 346 
.001, one-tailed Fishers Exact Test, FET). Sixty-two children (98%) used the same solution 347 
as they had witnessed in both T1 and T2 responses. In Phase 2, twenty-one children were 348 
allocated to the social-then-social-alternate condition. These children were more likely to use 349 
the demonstrated alternative (N = 16, 76% did so) than the originally demonstrated method (p 350 
< .05, Binomial test) in their first Phase 2 response (T3). This tendency to switch solutions 351 
was a result of the alternate social demonstration as children in the social-then-social-352 
alternate condition were significantly more likely to use an alternative method in T3 than 353 
those in the social-then-none (N = 21, p < .001, FET) and the social-then-social-agreeing (N = 354 
21, p < .001, FET) conditions, of which only 4 and 1 children respectively discovered a 355 
previously unused alternative.  356 
Witnessing a demonstration led to a significant increase in success, relative to those 357 
who received no demonstration, with children imitating the specific solution used by the 358 
model. This supports the widely held view that children are prolific social learners who 359 
faithfully imitate (Whiten et al., 2009). The children receiving social information in Phase 1 360 
were canalised to the socially demonstrated method in their Phase 1 response trials. However, 361 
when children with initial social information were shown an alternative solution of reward 362 
retrieval in Phase 2, the majority of them performed the newly demonstrated solution in their 363 
first subsequent Phase 2 trial which stands in contrast to chimpanzees who fail to adopt 364 
subsequent social information (Hopper et al., 2011).  365 
 366 
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3.2 Personally acquired information  367 
 The second research question investigated whether the source of the prior information 368 
affected the copying of subsequent, socially demonstrated solutions. In Phase 1 seventy-four 369 
(71%) children who witnessed no demonstration were successful at retrieving the reward in 370 
both Phase 1 response trials. Forty-three used the drawer and 31 the sweep solution, 371 
indicating no natural bias in solution choice (p = .201, Binomial test). Sixty-three of these 372 
children (85%) used the same solution on both trials; however, eleven children switched 373 
solution between T1 and T2. Therefore, children with personal information were significantly 374 
more likely to find more than one solution in Phase 1 than children with social information (N 375 
= 167, p < .01, FET). These eleven children either had no further demonstration (personal-376 
then-none) or a demonstration of one method (included in personal-then-social-agreeing). In 377 
Phase 2 thirty-two children were allocated to the personal-then-social-alternate condition. 378 
These children were more likely to use the demonstrated alternative solution (N = 24, 75% 379 
did so) than their personally discovered solution in their first task Phase 2 response (T3, p < 380 
.001, Binomial test). Multiple comparisons indicated that this tendency to switch solutions 381 
was a result of the social information demonstrated as children in the personal-then-social-382 
alternate condition were significantly more likely to use an alternative method in T3 than 383 
those in the personal-then-none (N = 15, p < .01, FET) and personal-then-social-agreeing (N 384 
= 16,
 
p < .01, FET) conditions, with 2 and 1 children respectively discovering a previously 385 
unused alternative. 386 
Children with personally acquired information were more likely than children with 387 
prior social information to discover multiple solutions in Phase 1. Allowing children to 388 
interact with artefacts before social demonstrations may encourage exploratory behaviour. 389 
Children with personally acquired information have been shown to disregard subsequent 390 
social information if it is inaccurate (Clément et al., 2004), unreliable (Ma & Ganea, 2010) or 391 
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unsuccessful (Williamson et al., 2008). In the current study the difficulty or effectiveness of 392 
the initial solution acquired was not manipulated, yet children in the personal-then-social-393 
alternate condition were still motivated to copy the alternative solution, predominantly 394 
attempting the alternative demonstrated solution in their first subsequent interaction with the 395 
task. This use of social information, when personally acquired information is sufficient and 396 
not costly, contrasts with studies of our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Hrubesch et al., 397 
2009), and many other non-human species (Kendal et al., 2005). The demonstration appeared 398 
to be the key element in driving exploration as the vast majority of children with successful 399 
personally acquired information who received no further information, or social information 400 
that agreed with their personal information, did not discover the alternative solution. It could 401 
be argued that children who receive demonstrations of a solution in agreement with their 402 
prior solution may view the puppet as imitating the child. However, we deem this an unlikely 403 
explanation as children may be unaware that any alternatives exist and the puppet also 404 
includes irrelevant actions so does not faithfully imitate the child.  405 
 406 
3.3 Solution choice over time 407 
Our third question addressed whether children would be motivated to incorporate 408 
multiple methods into their repertoire. All 137 children in the six initial-success conditions 409 
were given at least two trials (T3 and T4) in Phase 2 and 76 of these children were given the 410 
opportunity to perform a further three trials (see Table 2). Multiple comparisons (Bonferroni 411 
corrected; p = .017) were made based on whether initial information had been personal or 412 
social. There was no difference between children in the social-then-social-alternate and the 413 
personal-then-social-alternate conditions in relation to which solution (original or newly 414 
demonstrated) was used at T3 (N = 53, p = 1.0, FET) or T4 (p = .16, FET) or whether they 415 
used the same solution for both T3 and T4 or two different solutions over these trials (p = .17, 416 
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FET). Similarly, children with no information in Phase 2 (personal-then-none and social-417 
then-none) did not differ from each other in their likelihood of using one or two methods in 418 
Phase 2 whether those children who discovered two methods in Phase 1 were included (p = 419 
.05, FET) or excluded (p = .43, FET). Children with agreeing information in Phase 2 420 
(personal-then-social-agree and social-then-social-agree) did not differ from each other in 421 
their likelihood of using one or two methods in Phase 2 whether those children who 422 
discovered two methods in Phase 1 were included (p = .23, FET) or excluded (p = .43, FET).  423 
Comparisons were also made based on whether children had received alternate, 424 
agreeing, or no information in Phase 2, regardless of the source of their initial information. 425 
Children who received an alternate demonstration in Phase 2 (N = 53) used the recently 426 
demonstrated solution, significantly more than chance at T3 (75%, p < .001, FET), but by T4, 427 
only 23 (43%) used the recently demonstrated solution which did not differ from chance (p = 428 
.41, FET). Twenty-seven of these 53 children used two solutions in Phase 2 (T3 and T4 only) 429 
which was significantly different from the one child (out of 37) who did so from social-430 
agreeing conditions (excluding those who discovered two methods in Phase 1; p < .001, FET) 431 
and the one child (out of 35) who did so from conditions receiving no information in Phase 2 432 
(excluding those who discovered two methods in Phase 1; p < .001, FET). This difference 433 
between groups remained when analysing the 69 (excluding 9 that discovered two solutions 434 
in Phase 1) children that received five trials in Phase 2 [χ2 (2, N = 69) = 18.02, p < .001]. 435 
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Table 2: Number (and %) of children who alternated their solutions in Phase 2 (excluding children who discovered two methods in Phase 1). 436 
 
 
Phase 2: T3 and T4 
 
Phase 2: T5-T7 
 
Condition 
Completed  
T3 & T4 
(N = 125) 
Used a new 
solution in 
 T3- T4 
Two 
solutions 
T3 & T4 
 Completed  
T5, T6 & T7 
(N = 76) 
Used a new 
solution in 
T5-T7 
 
Personal-then-social-alternate 32 27       84% 19          60%  15 1 
 
Personal-then-social-agreeing 15 1           7% 1            7%  13 0 
 
Personal-then-none 16 2         14% 1            6%  15 3 
 
Social-then-social-alternate 21 18        86% 8           38%  7 0 
 
Social-then-social-agreeing 21 1          5% 0            0%  15 0 
 
Social-then-none 20 3         15% 0            0%  11 0 
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In Phase 1, children with personal information were more likely than children 437 
receiving social information to discover multiple methods. However, by Phase 2 there was no 438 
difference in whether one or two methods were employed when comparing across matched 439 
conditions. For example, the majority of children who witnessed a social demonstration of an 440 
alternate solution regardless of Phase 1 information source alternated between the two 441 
solutions in Phase 2. This was markedly different to children who received no further 442 
information or social-agreeing information who predominantly used their original solution. It 443 
seems that personally acquired information encourages initial exploration and when children 444 
witness alternative strategies they are motivated to incorporate these solutions into their 445 
repertoire. The children did not appear to interpret the new solution as a ‘correction’, but 446 
rather a possible alternative. As in Siegler and Opfer (2003), children adopted multiple 447 
strategies to solve a single problem. It is important to note the exceptions in all of these 448 
conditions: ten children from conditions where no alternate social information was received 449 
found an alternative solution in Phase 2. Thus, whilst the initial response trials of those with 450 
prior social information mirrored the canalisation shown in studies providing children with 451 
one or two attempts at a task (Flynn & Whiten, 2008b; Horner et al., 2006), the current 452 
results indicate that continued interaction encourages exploration (Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  453 
 454 
3.5 Irrelevant actions 455 
To begin this section the baseline production of the irrelevant actions is established. In 456 
Phase 1, of the children who were successful through acquiring personal information (N = 457 
74), 19 (26%) performed an irrelevant action. Apart from one child who performed three 458 
irrelevant actions in T1, all others performed just one irrelevant action (Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 459 
0.0, 0.0), resulting in the sweep or drawer being placed back to its original position, revealing 460 
a possible propensity to ‘tidy up’. Of those children who witnessed a demonstration including 461 
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irrelevant actions in Phase 1 (N = 63), 54 (86%) performed an irrelevant action. Thirty-three 462 
of these 54 children (61%) performed more than one irrelevant action (Mdn = 1.5, IQR = 1.0, 463 
5.0). Thus, despite the inclusion of ‘tidying up’ as an irrelevant action, children who 464 
witnessed a demonstration containing irrelevant actions produced significantly more 465 
irrelevant actions than those who did not in both T1 (χ2 (1, N = 137) = 57.61, p < .001) and 466 
T2 (χ2 (1, N = 137) = 49.73, p < .001).  467 
A critical question was whether prior task experience would reduce the copying of 468 
causally irrelevant actions in subsequent response trials. This was addressed in a number of 469 
ways looking at Phase 2 behaviour. First, would children with two alternate social 470 
demonstrations copy irrelevant actions when attempting the second solution or would 471 
viewing multiple methods enable them to extract only the critical causal sequence of actions? 472 
For children in the social-then-social-alternate condition there was no significant change in 473 
whether a child performed an irrelevant action between Phase 1 (T2) and Phase 2 (T3; 474 
Binomial, N = 21, p = .25) and in the number of irrelevant actions produced between T2 475 
(Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 0.5. 4.5) and T3 (Mdn = 1.0, IQR =1.0, 4.0, Wilcoxon Z = -0.91, p = .93). 476 
There was also no significant difference in the number of irrelevant actions produced in T3 477 
between children in the social-then-social-alternate condition and children in the social-then-478 
none (Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 0.0, 5.0, U (41) = 176.5, Z = -1.20, p = .23) and the social-then-479 
agreeing (Mdn = 1.00, IQR = 0.0, 5.0, U (41) = 216.5, Z = -0.11, p = .92) conditions.  480 
Second, what actions will children with personally acquired information perform 481 
following subsequent social information including irrelevant actions? In the personal-then-482 
social-agreeing condition six children (29%), who had not performed an irrelevant action in 483 
Phase 1, performed an irrelevant action in T3 (following a demonstration of the same 484 
solution). In this condition, whilst the number of children performing an irrelevant action did 485 
not increase significantly (McNemar, N = 21, p = .13), the number of irrelevant actions 486 
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produced did increase significantly from Phase 1 (T2: Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 0.0) to Phase 2 487 
(T3: Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 1.00, Wilcoxon Z = -2.11, p < .05). Similarly, for the 32 children 488 
in the personal-then-social-alternate condition, the number of children performing an 489 
irrelevant action increased significantly from T2 (N = 6) to T3 (N = 16; Binomial, N = 32, p < 490 
.01) as did the number of irrelevant actions (T2; Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 0.0, T3; M = 0.5, IQR 491 
= 0.0, 1.0, Wilcoxon Z = -3.16, p < .01). Of the 24 children in this condition that attempted 492 
the alternative solution in T3, 12 (50%) used an irrelevant action. These 12 children 493 
performed a median of 1 (IQR = 1.0, 3.0) irrelevant action, which was not significantly 494 
different from the 16 children in the social-then-social-alternate condition (Med = 1.0, IQR = 495 
1.0, 4.0, Mann-Whitney U (28) = 86, Z = -0.53, p = .60).  496 
For all 137 children in the initial (Phase 1) success conditions there was no significant 497 
difference, in the number of irrelevant actions produced, between T3 and T4 (Wilcoxon Z = -498 
1.71, p = .09), and so children’s mean scores across T3 and T4 were investigated across 499 
conditions (see Figure 2). Considering the mean number of irrelevant actions in T3 or T4, 500 
there was no main effect of Phase 2 information for those with personal information in Phase 501 
1 (personal-then-social-alternate/-agreeing/-none; Kruskal Wallis χ2 (2, N = 74) = 3.7, p = 502 
.16) or for those with social information in Phase 1 (social-then-social-alternate/-agreeing/-503 
none, T3: [χ2 (2, N = 63) = 1.27, p = .53]). Therefore, conditions were collapsed according to 504 
the source of the original information. Children with personally acquired information 505 
performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions (Mdn = 0.0, IQR = 0.0, 1.0) than children 506 
with prior social information (Mdn = 1.0, IQR = 1.0, 3.0, Mann-Whitney, U (135) = 1108.0, Z 507 
= -5.51, p < .001) during Phase 2 (T3 and T4). 508 
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 509 
Figure 2: Median and interquartile range of mean number irrelevant actions (out of a 510 
possible five) in Phase 2 (Mean of T3 & T4) for the six initial-success conditions.P1 511 
Personal; personal information in Phase 1, P1 Social; Social demonstration in Phase 1. *** 512 
p < 0.001.  513 
 514 
It appears that it is not prior experience itself which affects the copying of causally 515 
irrelevant actions but the type (personal or social) of prior experience. Those who had 516 
personal information in Phase 1 consistently performed fewer irrelevant actions than those 517 
who had social information in Phase 1. Children with prior social information continued to 518 
perform irrelevant actions regardless of the absence or presence of subsequent social 519 
information. Thus the copying of irrelevant actions was not affected by alternate 520 
demonstrations indicating that the children did not extract, from multiple alternatives, only 521 
the critical, causal sequence of actions to reach a desired goal (Byrne, 1999, Buchsbaum et 522 
al., 2011). We do not suggest that children are not capable of such efficiency but that in this 523 
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context, involving different irrelevant actions pertaining to different solutions with the same 524 
artefact, the ability is constrained. Children with prior social information, who copy 525 
demonstrated actions and succeed, may be more likely to assume that copying of subsequent 526 
actions is a successful strategy in this context.  527 
Successful prior-personal information appeared to give children both immunity and 528 
susceptibility to copying causally irrelevant actions. Of the children who produced no 529 
irrelevant actions at Phase 1, two-thirds (social agreeing) and half (social alternate) did not 530 
copy irrelevant actions following social demonstration. However, the remainder did and did 531 
so at a rate similar to children possessing prior-social information. The variance of behaviour 532 
of the children with prior-personal information suggests that irrelevant action reproduction 533 
may well be influenced by both the functional aspects of the task and social context. For 534 
example, possession of prior-personal, versus prior-social information may make children 535 
more sceptical about the function, whether social or causal, of observed causally irrelevant 536 
actions; possibly explaining why Williamson et al. (2008) and Williamson and Meltzoff 537 
(2011) found that children did not incorporate subsequent (albeit opaque) irrelevant actions 538 
after a successful and easy experience with the task. However, for individuals in the prior-539 
personal-social-alternate condition who did copy the demonstrated irrelevant actions, the 540 
unfamiliarity of the alternate solution may have resulted in children encoding the actions as 541 
causally relevant (Lyons et al., 2007) especially as more irrelevant actions were produced in 542 
this condition than where social information agreed with prior-personal information. As the 543 
task design ensured that these children already had a good understanding of the causal 544 
properties of the task we suggest, however, that children’s copying of irrelevant actions in 545 
this context was more likely a result of motivation to adopt the model’s seemingly purposeful 546 
(Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) or normative behaviour (Kenward et al., 2011; Kenward, 2012) 547 
or due to a motivation to share an experience with another (Užgiris, 1981). This highlights 548 
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the persuasiveness of social information, even when emitted by a puppet and this 549 
persuasiveness may be adaptive if it enables acquisition of cultural norms.  550 
 551 
4. General discussion 552 
The comprehensiveness of the current study enabled valuable insight into the role 553 
prior experience plays in children’s social learning strategies pertaining to solution choice 554 
and imitation of irrelevant actions. Our results extend the field of social learning in a number 555 
of important ways. We found that children who are allowed to interact with a task before 556 
witnessing social demonstrations manipulate the task in more ways than those that witness an 557 
initial social demonstration. Further, after new solutions are discovered, whether through 558 
personal or social experience, children were motivated to incorporate these new solutions into 559 
their repertoire but they were not ‘converted’ to these alternatives, instead they switched 560 
between solutions. This multiple strategy use is seen in other domains in children’s learning, 561 
such as mathematics (Siegler & Opfer, 2003) and continues into adulthood (Dowker, Flood, 562 
Griffiths, Harriss, & Hook, 1996). Adopting further strategies when one already has a 563 
successful strategy may seem cognitively inefficient, but there are several reasons why it is 564 
beneficial. First, learning about a new strategy is useful in the event that an original strategy 565 
fails. Second, learning multiple strategies increases one’s overall knowledge of the task and 566 
provides generalisable knowledge regarding the properties of each strategy and the 567 
affordances of different manipulandi. In a tool-abundant culture the latter is valuable 568 
knowledge. Third, a motivation to acquire additional knowledge enables modifications over 569 
time. This ‘ratchet effect’ has been speculated to be the bedrock of cumulative culture, a 570 
process thought to be unique to humans (Dean et al., 2012; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). 571 
The current study also makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the 572 
phenomenon of copying causally irrelevant actions. Overall, children who hold personal 573 
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information about a task are less likely than those receiving only social information to 574 
incorporate causally irrelevant actions after observing them displayed by others. Children 575 
with initial social information faithfully copy causally irrelevant actions even after continued 576 
personal task interaction and despite the fact that the actions occurred with a transparent box 577 
(revealing the irrelevance of the actions) and after the relevant action (the reward capsule had 578 
been successfully moved to the lower level barrier) as has been found previously (Simpson & 579 
Riggs, 2011). Successful prior-personal information appeared to give some children 580 
immunity from copying causally irrelevant actions whilst other children were still susceptible 581 
to copying these actions, illustrating that the copying of causally irrelevant actions is an 582 
intricate phenomenon and no one explanation may capture its complexities. Children’s 583 
solution choice, their reasoning about causality, their motivation to share an experience with 584 
a model and the pressure to conform to norms will all vary depending upon task difficulty 585 
(Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011), the number of models (Asch, 1951), the characteristics of the 586 
model(s) (Wood et al., 2012), the audience (Haun & Tomasello, 2011) and, as has been 587 
shown in the current study, the prior information a child has regarding a task. These variables 588 
can be addressed individually or in combination and will enable a better understanding of 589 
children’s motivation to learn certain aspects of a task from others. Studies that establish the 590 
complexity of children’s social learning will shed more light on how and why humans stand 591 
alone in the breadth, detail, and cumulative nature of their culturally-rich world. 592 
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